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Abstract
Third parties are thought to face a tradeoff in that those actions most likely to
bring peace in the short run appear least likely to ensure its long run stability. Yet
the tradeoff between conflict management and conflict resolution may be overstated.
Analyzing an iterated three player bargaining model with both information and com-
mitment problems, we first demonstrate two conditions under which third parties may
produce lasting peace through conditional subsidies, even without addressing under-
lying informational or commitment problems. Second, we illustrate this possibility
by analyzing the impact of US foreign aid on patterns of conflict and peace between
Israel and her neighbors. Our analysis indicates that the termination of the rivalry
between Israel and Egypt was most likely not brought about by the Camp David ac-
cords or peacekeeping operations, but by sustained foreign aid provision. We discuss
the implications for both this conflict and conflict management more broadly.
∗We thank Andrew Boutton, Bill Reed, Ben Horne, W. Kindred Winecoff, and Scott Wolford for helpful
comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are our own.
†Author names appear alphabetically.
Can third parties bring lasting peace?
Recent work suggests a depressing answer, telling us that the conditions under which
conflict resolution can be achieved are limited, while mere conflict management only delays
the inevitable (Beardsley 2008, 2011, Werner and Yuen 2005). In contrast, we argue that
third parties can sometimes bring lasting peace even without addressing the underlying
information and commitment problems that might otherwise lead to war. Under certain
conditions, genuine conflict resolution is not necessary to prevent war indefinitely.
To develop our argument, we analyze a bargaining model that allows for both information
and commitment problems. We first discuss an equilibrium that illustrates extant claims
about the counterproductive nature of conflict management. We then discuss two equilibria
in which third parties can produce lasting peace. When the primary obstacle to negotiation
is a commitment problem induced by a rapid shift in power, subsidies in the short term bring
lasting peace. When the primary obstacle stems from information problems, sustained third
party commitments can bring peace in both the short and long term.
We then illustrate the plausibility and applicability of these results with a quantitative
case study of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We demonstrate that, from 1948 to 2001, conflict
between Israel and her Arab neighbors occurred more frequently in the presence of conditions
that exacerbate information and commitment problems, but only when the US did not
provide foreign aid. Moreover, since 1973, the US has provided more economic aid to Israel
and Egypt when observable indicators suggested that armed conflict would otherwise be
particularly likely. Taken together, these results indicate that the primary reason Israel and
Egypt have been at peace for forty years is external subsidies.
Recent events, we think, lend credence to this view. While briefly in power, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s political arm threatened to “revisit” the 1979 treaty with Israel if the US were
to cut off aid, (New York Times, 3/16/2012). According to the New York Times, “Egyptians
have long considered American aid as a kind of payment for preserving the peace despite the
popular resentment of Israel.”
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After discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict, we briefly consider other cases where third
parties have either fostered or reinforced peace through the selective provision of tangible
economic benefits. We focus specifically on Greek and Turkish trade with the US following
the Turco-Cypriot War, the EU’s insistence on normalized relations between Serbia and
Kosovo as a condition for Serbian accession, and the role of democracy aid in preventing
civil conflict in democratizing states.
We conclude by discussing the implications of our work for the study and practice of
conflict management.
Managing and Resolving Conflicts
A consensus has recently emerged around three findings in the study of third party influ-
ence on the stability of postwar peace.1 First, the recurrence of war is less likely when
the belligerents are allowed to “fight it out” than when they are interrupted by third par-
ties.2 Second,consent-based peacekeeping discourages the recurrence of conflict.3 Finally,
the prospects for genuine conflict resolution are bleak. While some have articulated condi-
tions under which mediation resolves information problems that might otherwise give rise to
conflict,4 a critical assumption of such arguments is that third parties possess information
the belligerents have already been assumed to have an incentive to keep private;5 without
such an assumption, there is little reason to expect mediation as information revelation to
resolve conflicts, and no systematic evidence that it does so (Fey and Ramsay 2010).
1In contrast, there is little consensus regarding the effect of third party intervention in an ongoing war.
See, inter alia, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008), Regan and Aydin (2006), Regan (2002).
2See especially Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2008, 2011). On the value of decisive outcomes,
see also Senese and Quackenbush (2003) and Quackenbush and Venteicher (2008).
3See Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Fortna (2004), and Gilligan and Sergenti (2008). However, see also Lo,
Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008).
4See especially Kydd (2003).
5Note that Smith and Stam (2003) similarly conclude there is little prospect for mediation to reveal
information in practice. They argue that the theoretical possibility of information revelation via mediation
exists, but in practice mediators are often too biased for their efforts to be credible. Of course, Kydd
(2003) argues that it precisely because of their bias that mediators are sometimes able to credibly convey
information. But Kydd has little to say about how mediators come to posses such information.
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In short, recent work indicates that third parties are unable to produce genuine conflict
resolution for the very reasons that states find it difficult to reach negotiated settlements
on their own. This suggests that mere conflict management, which is thought to only bring
peace in the short term, is the only option open to would-be peacemakers.
The bargaining literature tells us that wars are likely to end only once a convergence of
expectations about each side’s capabilities and/or resolve has been reached, unless of course
one side is defeated outright.6 Once this convergence occurs, neither side can reasonably
expect to profit from continuing to fight, and peace becomes self-enforcing. Thus, Werner
and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2008, 2011) argue that when third parties press for peace
before belief convergence, they sow the seeds of future conflict. Since the third party’s interest
will inevitably wane, such intervention does little more than kick the can down the road.
We add an important caveat: while the third party’s attention might often wane, we
need not assume that it always does—and if the third party is willing to provide subsidies
in perpetuity, then war may forever loom beyond the horizon. This is important because the
exceptions—such as the extended commitment on behalf of the United States to maintaining
peace between Egypt and Israel, or managing relations between Greece and Turkey—concern
conflicts of great interest to the international system.
Further, we demonstrate below that one-time transfers are sufficient when third parties
seek to prevent conflicts arising from commitment problems induced by rapid shifts in power.
The intuition here, simply enough, is that future shifts in power create temporary problems.
Thus, temporary fixes are sufficient.7 An unappreciated implication of the logic linking rapid
shifts in power to war is that once the shift occurs, the problem goes away.8 It is not the
shift itself that causes war, but the anticipation thereof, and the incentive this creates for
preventive war. Third parties thus need only raise the cost of war to until the shift transpires.
We turn now to the formal model we use to develop the logic of our argument.
6See especially Wagner (2000), Powell (2004a) and Slantchev (2003b). Slantchev and Leventog˘lu (2007)
and Powell (2012) demonstrate that limited wars can also resolve commitment problems.
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
8However, see Reed, Wolford, and Arena (N.d.).
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The Model
Two actors, A and B, dispute the division of a good or bundle of goods whose value is nor-
malized to 1.9 Some third party, C, is primarily interested in ensuring a peaceful outcome.10
Each period t ∈ [1,∞) begins with C proposing some bundle of subsidies, consisting of
σAt ∈ [0,∞) and σBt ∈ [0,∞), where σAt is the amount to be allocated to A in the event
that an agreement is reached, and σBt is the amount that will be allocated to B. For ease
of exposition, let σt = σAt + σBt denote the total subsidies that C offers.
Though C announces the size of σAt and σBt at the start of the period, and thus A and
B are aware of what they stand to lose if they fight, C only delivers σt if war is averted.
After observing C’s choice of σtA and σtB, A decides whether to attack B immediately
or enter negotiations,11 which we model using the ultimatum bargaining protocol. That is,
A proposes some division of the good, such that xt ∈ [0, 1] is allocated to A and 1− xt to B
in the event of an agreement. Should B accept this proposal, it is implemented, and A and
B’s flow payoffs reflect their shares of the good as well as σtA and σtB.
We abstract away from the very real possibility that belligerents fail to uphold their
agreements in order to focus on situations where obstacles to peace exist despite common
knowledge that enforceable agreements are available.12
If B rejects A’s proposal, a battle occurs. This may represent either the onset or con-
tinuation of war, depending upon the decisions made in t − 1. Regardless of whether an
agreement is struck or a battle fought, play then proceeds to period t+ 1. Neither peace nor
war is treated as a terminal outcome here, the way one or the other is in most models.13
9Note that we need not assume that A and B represent internationally recognized sovereign states, though
negotiations between governments a non-state actors may differ from those between states in ways we do
not explore here.
10We’ll generally assume the third party is a state, but we could easily envision C as an international
governmental organization (IGO) or non-governmental organization (NGO) instead.
11Naturally, there is no reason that B could not also attack immediately. But since we will assume that
the passage of time strictly advantages B, it is only A that would ever have a clear incentive to do so.
12This assumption is standard in the literature. However, see Schultz (2010), who demonstrates that when
actors have incentives to defect from agreements, and cannot monitor compliance, war may be unavoidable.
13See, inter alia, Filson and Werner (2002), Powell (2004b), Slantchev (2003a,b), Slantchev and Leventog˘lu
(2007), Smith and Stam (2004) and Wagner (2000) for examples of models where negotiations end the
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We allow for both informational and commitment problems. Specifically, we assume
that if A attacks in t, A wins the resulting battle with probability ptI =
mtA
mtA +mtB
,
whereas A wins battles that occur after failed attempts at negotiation with probability
ptN =
mtA
mtA +mtB + αt
, where αt > 0 ensures that ptI > ptN . Let mti > 0 denote the mate-
rial capabilities of i ∈ {A,B} in period t, and let αt denote the advantage accruing to B if
A does not attack immediately. Further, let the value of mtA and αt be common knowledge
while only B knows the value of mtB. We assume that A and C only know that mtB = mtB
with probability ω and mtB = mtB with probability 1− ω, where mtB < mtB. Thus, A and
C both know the probability with which B will be relatively weak or relatively strong, and
also know that, regardless of B’s initial capabilities, B will be more difficult to defeat if A
does not attack immediately.14 We also assume ptI > pt+1I and ptN > pt+1B, which ensures
that A will not attack immediately in t′ > t if A does not do so in t.
Should a battle take place, both A and B suffer a loss of utility due to the costs of war,
denoted c ∈ (0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we do not allow c to vary by i (i.e., by actor), t
(i.e., period), or the circumstances under which fighting occurred (pre- or post-negotiations).
We model battles as partially decisive. Let qt ∈ (0, 1) denote the share of the good in
dispute possessed by A at the start of period t, with 1 − qt held by B, where qt reflects
some initial value, q0, as well as all previous battle outcomes. Should A prevail in period
t, A’s share of the good becomes qt ≡
qt + βt
1 + βt
, where βt ∈ (0, 1) indexes the stakes of the
battle fought in period t.15 Should B prevail in period t, then A’s share of the good shifts
to q
t
≡ qt
1 + βt
. Since qt > qt > qt, A’s share of the good in dispute strictly increases after
battlefield victories and decreases after defeats.16
game. See Fearon (1995), Fey and Ramsay (2010), Powell (1996, 2006) and Tarar and Leventog˘lu (2008) for
examples of models where war ends the game. However, see Powell (2012) for an example of a model that,
like ours, allows the game to continue in either case.
14While the actual capabilities each side possesses may change over time, we assume that B’s type is fixed.
That is, while mtB need not equal mt+xB , if mtB = mtB , then mt+xB will equal mt+xB .
15Note, qt becomes qt+1, provided a battle occurs in t and A is victorious.
16Naturally, B controls however much of the good is not possessed by A. For example, if a battle occurs
in period t and A prevails, then B’s share of the good in dispute for period t is 1− qt + βt
1 + βt
.
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C receives 0 in any period in which fighting occurs and ιt − σt if A and B reach an
agreement, where ιt > 0 reflects the degree of C’s interest in seeing a peaceful outcome in
period t. In practice, it is unlikely that C truly has no preference whatsoever in the outcome
of a war between A and B, but we abstract away from such concerns to focus attention on
situations where C’s prevailing concern is stability.17
While we allow most of the parameters to vary with t, we do not focus on the implications
of changes over time in most of them. One exception is ιt, which we assume is subject to
exogenous shocks between periods. This allows us to analyze cases where C’s interest wanes,
as it is typically assumed to, as well as cases where it is relatively stable.
Baseline Analysis
We begin by establishing a set of baseline expectations when C does not provide subsidies,
which largely mirror results that are well-established in the literature. We will refer back to
these when discussing our expectations for Arab-Israeli relations absent US intervention.
There are many pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) to our model.18 To ease
exposition, we focus on a few key results that yield clear empirical implications with respect
to the likelihood of conflict and the distribution of material capabilities.19
Proposition 1. War is more likely when the distribution of capabilities is shifting rapidly.
Proposition 2. War is more likely if the two sides are near parity.
17Assigning C a payoff of 0 in the event of war also overlooks the possibility that domestic or international
audiences might punish C for failing to do everything in their power to prevent conflict. While we believe
such dynamics might well be at work in some real world situations, perhaps including US management of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we leave this possibility for future analysis.
18MPEs require actors to play Markov strategies, or those that maximize their expected utilities as of
period t, treating each period as a distinct sub-game. The actors thus do not condition on the history of
play, except insofar as this history pertains to their per-period payoffs.
19Our model provides novel implications about the technology of war that we do not explore here. For
example, as βt decreases, we see increases in the threshold that determines whether A attacks B immediately
and as well as the threshold that determines whether A selects a value of xt that risks war if A chooses
to attempt negotiations at all. This suggests that peace is more stable when a single battlefield victory
will produce little advantage. Second, our model indicates that war need not be inefficient, provided the
implications of victory on the battlefield for future payoffs are large enough. However, we leave fuller
exploration of these results for future analysis.
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Proposition 3. Rapid shifts that bring the distribution of capabilities closer to parity are
more likely to cause war than are shifts away from parity.
Neither of the first two results is particularly novel.20 However, we believe ours is the first
bargaining model to point to both results simultaneously, and to further indicate that the
conditions under which A chooses to forgo negotiations, attacking outright, are more readily
satisfied when the looming shift in power would bring the two sides closer to parity.2122
Should A forgo the opportunity to attack B immediately, there are only two proposals
A offers in equilibrium. One, denoted xt, ensures that B will accept regardless of type. The
other, xt, allocates a larger share to A but is only accepted if B is relatively weak. A proposes
x if and only if ω > ωˆtx, or only when sufficiently optimistic such terms will be accepted.
When ω > ωˆtx, A prefers to attack B immediately provided ω > ωˆtb. When ω ≤ ωˆtx, A
attacks immediately provided ω > ωˆtm. Using these three thresholds, which are defined in
the appendix, we can fully characterize A’s strategy.
Delaying the Inevitable
We begin our consideration of the impact of subsidies by returning to the argument made
by Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2008, 2011). In particular, we consider the
possibility that even if attempts to end fighting are successful in the short term, they only
delay the inevitable. In fact, we present a slightly stronger version of the argument—our
model indicates that third parties can not only sow the seeds of future conflicts by ending
wars prematurely, but also when they prevent wars. This suggests that we might find further
empirical support for their argument if we look beyond cases where third party intervention
ended an ongoing war to cases where subsidies were offered during times of peace.
We are now prepared to state our first key result regarding external subsidies.
20See, inter alia, Fearon (1995) and Powell (2004b, 2006) on rapid shifts in power. On the relationship
between parity and uncertainty, see Slantchev (2004) and Reed (2003).
21Consult the appendix for formal proofs of these and all propositions.
22Taken together, these results echo the primary arguments of Power Transition Theory. See, inter alia,
Organski (1958), Organski and Kugler (1980) and Lemke (2002).
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Proposition 4. If C’s interests are insufficiently stable over time, subsides shift the risk of
war due to informational problems from the present into the future.
While a more formal proof can be found in the appendix, the intuition behind this result
is straightforward. Suppose ωˆtx < ω ≤ ωˆtb would hold should C set σt = 0.23 This would
indicate that, if C does not provide any subsidies, A would forgo the opportunity to attack
outright, but would risk war with the terms it proposes to B. Thus, if C does not act, there
is a chance that war will break out. Under such conditions, there exist equilibria in which
C provides sufficiently large subsidies in period t to ensure that A no longer finds it optimal
to risk war. By increasing the opportunity cost of war, C reduces A’s incentive to respond
to uncertainty by risking war in hopes of attaining a better deal.
However, when C does so, this does not address the fundamental source of the problem.
Should an exogenous shock in t + 1 yield ιt+1 < ιt, C may not provide sufficient subsidies
to dissuade A from risking war in t+ 1. That is, we can readily identify equilibria in which
C prevents A from risking war in period t but sets σ = 0 in period t + 1. Since A learns
nothing about B’s private information in t, the information problem remains at t + 1, and
once C’s subsidies go away, A will then propose terms that B might reject.
Put differently, C can temporarily mitigate the consequences of A’s information problem
by subsidizing peaceful outcomes. A’s uncertainty over B’s military capabilities remains,
but A has less incentive to risk war in hopes of getting a better deal when rejection not only
means incurring c but forgoing σA. Yet if C’s interest suddenly decreases, prompting C to
cease providing subsidies, then A will risk war by setting xt+1 = xt+1.
This largely confirms the claim that when third parties manipulate material incentives
rather than resolving the underlying causes of war, they only delay the inevitable. Whether
third parties seek to manipulate the decision of the belligerents by offering subsidies that
reward peace, by attempting to raise the costs of fighting (Werner and Yuen 2005), or some
mix thereof, they do nothing to prevent A from risking war once the external force is removed.
23Which, to be more precise, implies that C has set σAt = σBt = 0.
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Getting Through Tough Times
Let us now turn to cases where C provides subsidies ahead of a large shift in power but does
not do so once the shift has transpired. We focus here on cases where the primary obstacle
to negotiated agreements is one of credible commitment.24
The anticipation of a future shift in power can lead to war, but the commitment problem
stemming therefrom disappears once the shift occurs. Shifts in power are not themselves
destabilizing, at least according to the standard logic of commitment problems. Understand-
ing that helps one to appreciate our next result.
Proposition 5. Temporary subsidies from C may promote peace in both the short and long
term, provided the primary obstacle to negotiated agreements is a commitment problem in-
duced by a looming rapid shift in power.
Suppose ωˆtm < ω ≤ ωˆtx would hold provided σt = 0. This indicates that, absent any
influence from C, A would attack B, though were A to attempt negotiations, A would issue
a proposal that B would accept regardless of type. Should C select a sufficiently large value
of σt, that will compensate A (either directly, in the form of σtA, or indirectly, in the form
of σtB, which allows A to demand more from B) for the loss in bargaining power that A
is about to suffer. Yet C need not provide any subsidies in t + 1, since the incentive for A
attack outright rather than attempt negotiations will be gone by then.
Always a Day Away
Even when the primary obstacle to a negotiated settlement is an information problem that
won’t fade away when the current period ends, there is room for hope. While we do not
dispute that, on average, peace will be less stable following wars that end without the players’
beliefs converging, this masks variation that is potentially quite relevant to both scholars and
24If both problems are present, C can still eliminate the risk of war, though this potentially requires even
greater subsidies. Moreover, if C only provides sufficient subsidies to offset the commitment problem, the ex
ante probability of war still drops from 1 to 1− ω.
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policy makers. That is, if C fails to resolve the underlying problem, but maintains interest
in the dispute, war indefinitely hovers just over horizon, without ever actually occurring.
Proposition 6. If C is willing to provide arbitrarily large subsidies in each of an indefi-
nite number of periods, C can indefinitely prevent wars that would otherwise occur without
resolving the underlying informational problem.
Suppose that ωˆtx < ω ≤ ωˆtb would hold if σt = 0. This indicates that unless C provides
sufficiently large subsidies, A will propose terms that B will accept only if relatively weak.
However, provided ιt is sufficiently large, and any exogenous shocks in the future are expected
to be relatively small, C offers arbitrarily large subsidies in each of an indefinite number of
periods, and peace is ensured in each.25 C’s behavior is causally responsible for the peace
that obtains in equilibrium, as the probability of war would be positive if C did not provide
subsidies. But A remains uncertain about B’s capabilities.
Informally, if C is likely to remain committed to preventing war tomorrow, and the day
after that, it doesn’t much matter that C only engages in conflict management rather than
resolution. Either way, the probability of war will be negligible for the foreseeable future.
Of course, we do not dispute that resolving the underlying cause of the conflict would be
preferable to raising the effective costs thereof, if at all possible. As discussed above, however,
recent work suggests that it generally is not. We have growing reason to believe that states
benefit from actions that create uncertainty (Meirowitz and Sartori 2008) and that there are
significant challenges facing third parties who attempt to facilitate the credible revelation of
information that the belligerents do not wish to have revealed (Fey and Ramsay 2010).26 It
therefore may not be fruitful to focus on the credible revelation of private information as a
path to peace, even if we believe that the primary cause of war in most cases is the incentive
states have to misrepresent their private information.
25The minimum shock sufficient to cause C to cease providing subsidies depends on ιt. Thus, the result is
more likely to hold either as C’s interests increase, or as they grow less prone to fluctuation over time.
26Moreover, the partial revelation of private information may also make war more likely rather than less
(Arena and Wolford 2012).
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Subsidized Peace between Israel and Her Neighbors
Taken together, our propositions lead us to expect that subsidies from a third party may do
more than simply shift the risk of war into the near future. To illustrate this possibility, we
use a quantitative case study of United States’ involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Our basic argument is as follows. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948–1949 marked the onset
of a territorial rivalry between various Arab states and Israel, who captured vast swaths of
territory—territory that, under the UN Partition Plan, was to be allocated to the Pales-
tinians. In the subsequent years, several wars occurred, but a fear of Soviet involvement
typically led the US to intervene, pressuring the belligerents into ending the conflict prema-
turely. However, the US did not initially seek to shore up the peace it created by providing
conditional subsidies in the form of foreign aid, as it later would. Unsurprisingly, then, each
new spell of peace proved no more stable than the last.27
All of that changed in the fall of 1973. The Yom Kippur War sparked a chain of events
that collectively constituted an exogenous shock to the level of US interest in maintaining
stability in the region and thus a change in strategy. Specifically, while the October war
did not directly cause a shortfall in the production of oil, it played an important role in
motivating the Arab Oil Embargo that in turn led to the 1973 Oil Crisis that sent the
United States into a deep recession that kicked off an unprecedented period of stagflation.28
Thus, the US had a greater incentive to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict than ever before.
27This is, of course, a stylized account. There were a great many other factors involved in the terminations
and origins of each of these wars. The behavior of the US is by no means the only, or even the primary,
factor accounting for the ebb and flow of tensions. Nonetheless, we believe the above description captures
one of the important aspects of this complex conflict.
28On the macroeconomic importance of oil price shocks, see Hamilton (1983). However, it is worth noting
that the relationship between political events, supply shocks, price shocks, and macroeconomic performance
is not straightforward. Hamilton (2003) argues that the relationship is non-linear, with spikes in the price of
oil having a greater impact than sudden drops, while Kilian (2008) and Barsky and Kilian (2004) argue that
the relationship is partly endogenous, with macroeconomic performance predicting price increases. They
argue that the impact of political events, such as conflicts in the Middle East, has been overstated. However,
they also stress the variance in the impact of different conflicts, arguing that there is a stronger case for the
1973 Yom Kippur War, and the embargoes that followed, causing a US recession than there is for 1979–
1980 Iranian Revolution or the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War. While we do not wish to overstate the role
of this conflict, we note that even critics of simplistic narratives linking Middle East turmoil to recessions
acknowledge that the oil embargoes of 1973 are, if nothing else, the exception that proves the rule.
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While traditional explanations of the remarkable transformation of Israeli-Egyptian re-
lations in the years that followed emphasize the Camp David accords and/or peacekeeping
operations, we argue that the dramatic increase in the provision of US foreign aid to both Is-
rael and Egypt is the best explanation for the absence of war between Israel and Egypt since
1973. While there is every reason to believe that information and commitment problems
have remained/returned, as we’ll discuss below, the United States’ sustained commitment
to subsidizing peace continues to discourage conflict to this day.29
That is, we do not argue that the United States managed to resolve the conflict between
Israel and Egypt. Rather, we argue that the US realized in 1973 that the price of continued
conflict was greater than it had once believed, and so began devoting substantial resources
towards managing the conflict. The success of such a strategy over a period of 40 years
stands in contrast to the expectations of Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2011), but
we nonetheless stress that our argument implies the potential for a return to conflict between
Israel and Egypt should the US ever cease providing subsidies.
To support this argument, we turn now to analysis both of patterns of conflict between
Israel and her Arab neighbors and variation in the provision of foreign aid by the US. We
demonstrate that, in the absence of subsidies from the US in the form of foreign aid, parity
and anticipated future shifts in power are associated with an increase in the incidence of the
most hostile militarized interstate disputes, as anticipated by Propositions 1, 2 and Corollary
3. Yet as the total amount of economic aid provided by the US increases, this effect shrinks,
eventually disappearing altogether, as Propositions 5 and 6 would lead us to expect. Finally,
we demonstrate that since the Yom Kippur War, one of the key determinants of the amount
of economic aid received by Israel and Egypt in any given year is the presence of observable
factors that indicate an elevated risk of conflict. This suggests that aid not only facilitates
peace, but is provided, at least in part, because it facilitates peace.
29In fairness, the United States has many reasons for providing foreign aid to Israel. One might argue that
any US threat to withdraw aid to Israel in the event of a war with Egypt might not be credible. It is not
clear to us that this is the case, but either way, the relationship between aid to Egypt and peaceful relations
with Israel seems quite clear—not only to us, but to the Egyptians as well, as discussed above.
12
Data and Operationalization
Our unit of analysis is the dyad-year. We have data for four dyads each from 1948 to 2001,
one for each of Israel’s contiguous neighbors: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.30 This
yields an average of 45 yearly observations per dyad, after exclusions due to missing data.
Our dependent variable is Violent MIDsd,t, which records the number of new militarized
interstate disputes (MIDs) in dyad d in year t involving the use of force.31 Data for this mea-
sure come from version 3.1 of the Militarized Interstate Disputes data set (Ghosn, Palmer,
and Bremer 2004). The minimum of Violent MIDsd,t is 0, and the maximum is 3.
To capture the effect of external subsidies, we include the total amount of economic aid
given by the US to dyad d in year t, denoted Econ Aidd,t, measured in millions of constant
2005 US dollars.32 The variable ranges from 0 to over 5,500 (i.e., $5.5 billion).33
We measure parity as Parityd,t = 1 −
(
lnCINCHi,t
lnCINCHi,t + lnCINC Lo,t
)
, where lnCINCHi,t
denotes the log of the higher Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score in year
30That is, our sample begins with Israel’s proclamation of independence and ends in the last year for which
the data on militarized interstate disputes are available.
31Focusing on MIDs that at least involve the use of force, as opposed to including all MIDs, decreases
the risk of confirming our expectations about the incidence of violent conflict with actions states undertake
in an effort to prevent such an outcome. That is, the two categories below the use of force, threats to use
force and shows of force, might well represent attempts to signal resolve (Fearon 1997, Slantchev 2005). By
excluding threats to use force and displays of force, we narrow the dependent variable from 61 non-zero
observations to 52, of which 19 violent MIDs involved Egypt, 8 Jordan, 6 Lebanon and 19 Syria. We do not
further restrict our focus to the highest category of disputes, those labeled wars according to an arbitrary
fatality threshold, because our game-theoretic model only concerns whether states resort to an inefficient
use of violence, irrespective of whether that violence meets a certain criterion of intensity. That is, while we
used the term “war” above to refer to outcomes in which the actors did not reach a peaceful agreement, we
did so using a broader conceptualization thereof than is embodied in the MID project’s coding rules.
32Data available from the United States Agency for International Development website (US Agency for
International Development 2011). The subsidies are measured as total amounts allocated per dyad because
the model indicates that subsidies provided to B have the same effect, if for a different reason, as those
provided to A. That is, conditional subsidies to A directly increase the effective cost of war for A, discouraging
it from either attack or risking war with its choice of terms. Subsidies provided to B allow A to extract
greater concessions without provoking resistance, and so also reduce this incentive, albeit indirectly. Note
that we did not include provision of military aid, as it is likely that this form of aid is given for different
reasons, and, moreover, influences the distribution of military capabilities. In our theoretical model, we
assumed that the subsidies provided by C were simply of intrinsic value to A and B. Consideration of third
party subsidies that alter capabilities, both theoretically and empirically, lies outside the scope of this paper.
33Note that the USAID website does not report disbursements under $50,000. The lowest nonzero value
in our dataset is .7, or $700,000.
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t and lnCINC Lo,t denotes the log of the lower CINC score in that year.
3435 This variable
ranges from 0.4, extreme preponderance, to 0.5, perfect parity.
Recall that it is the anticipation of a future shift in power, one that will not occur
in equilibrium if A attacks, that is expected to promote conflict. Thus, we construct
Future Declined,t =
(
ln( ˆCINCHi,t+1)
ln( ˆCINCHi,t+1) + ln( ˆCINC Lo,t+1)
)
−
(
ln(CINCHi,t)
ln(CINCHi,t) + ln(CINC Lo,t)
)
,
which records the extent to which the stronger state’s share of capabilities is predicted to de-
crease from year t to year t+1.36 This variable ranges from -.003 to 0.003. Note that positive
values of Future Declined,t indicate that the stronger state anticipates a future decline in its
standing relative to the weaker state, whereas negative values indicate that they anticipate
increased dominance.37 In accordance with Corollary 3, we expect anticipated shifts that
bring the two sides nearer to parity (i.e., those in which the dominant state is expecting to
lose its advantage over the weaker state) to be especially likely to promote conflict.
Recall that we have not argued that the US resolved the conflict—in which case, there
would be little risk of conflict no matter what the US did—but that the provision of con-
ditional subsidies in the form of foreign aid severs the link between information and com-
mitment problems, on the one hand, and conflict, on the other. This implies an interactive
relationship. Thus, we interact Econ Aidd,t both with Parityd,t and Future Declined,t.
We control for the presence of peacekeeping missions in each dyad-year with PKOd,t, a
trichotomous variable, where 0 indicates the absence of any peacekeeping operation, 1 indi-
cates monitoring (unarmed military observers), and 2 indicates armed peacekeeping forces.38
34The data on the CINC scores come from the Correlates of War data set on National Material Capabilities
(version 4.0), updated to cover the years of 1816-2007 from the original publication in Singer, Bremer, and
Stucky (1972). CINC scores record a state’s share of the world’s total material capabilities, as measured by
demographic, military, and industrial factors.
35We log each side’s CINC score because the distribution of CINC scores exhibits a right skew, and we
have little reason to believe that a given increase in capabilities has the same effect for states that are already
powerful as for those who are relatively weak.
36The predicted values, ˆCINCHi,t+1 and ˆCINCLo,t+1 are generated, separately, by regressing CINC scores
for each state in year t on CINC scores in year t−1 and the military aid provided by the US to each state in
year t− 1. The predicted values from these regressions give us predicted values in year t. We use the values
for year t+ 1 to obtain ˆCINCHi,t+1 and ˆCINCLo,t+1.
37Naturally, values close to 0 then indicate that the dyadic distribution of material capabilities could be
expected to remain more or less constant from year t to year t+ 1.
38Taken from the data in Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008), who expanded the data from Fortna (2003) to
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We do not account for the Camp David accords for two reasons. First, our results are
substantively similar if we include a binary variable equal to one for Israeli-Egyptian dyads
starting in 1979. Second, this variable itself is not statistically significant. It only exhibits
a negative association with Violent MIDsd,t when we exclude the measures used to capture
our argument (i.e., Econ Aidd,t and its interactions with Parityd,t and Future Declined,t).
39
Finally, to correct for temporal dependence, we also include Violent MIDsd,t−1.40
Absent any evidence that foreign aid allocations increase when conflict would otherwise
be likely, our claim that the US brought peace between Israel and Egypt through external
subsidies might be regarded as suspect. Therefore, we assess not only the impact, but also
the determinants, of US economic assistance. For our analysis of Econ Aidd,t, our primary
explanatory variable reflects the number of MIDs involving the use of force that might be
expected to occur absent any attempts at conflict management, Expected MIDsd,t, which
is the predicted value of Violent MIDsd,t generated from a baseline model. This model is
similar to the model we employ to test our expectations about conflict management, save
for two important differences. First, it does not include any of the measures of third party
attempts at conflict management.41 Second, we include the CINC scores for each state in
the dyad, CINC 1,t and CINC 2,t in order to improve the predictive power of the model.
42
Since we argue that the US only became interested in subsidizing peace after 1973, we
also include Post Yom Kippur t. This variable takes on a value of 1 in all years after 1973
and 0 in all years up to and including 1973. More importantly, we interact this variable with
Expected MIDsd,t. This will allow us to determine whether there is a positive association
between Expected MIDsd,t after 1973, yet no relationship prior to 1973, as per our argument.
We also include Econ Aidd,t−1, Econ Aidd,t−2, and Econ Aidd,t−3, as well as a binary
variable equal to 1 for that dyad and 0 otherwise.
1914-2001. We note that our results are the virtually identical regardless of whether we try alternate model
specifications to test the for effect of monitoring missions separately from the armed peacekeeping missions.
39Results available upon request.
40The inclusion of additional lags did not improve model fit, nor were lags beyond the first significant.
41That is, we omit Econ Aidd,t, the interaction terms involving Econ Aidd,t, and PKOd,t from this model.
42The results of this baseline model are available from the authors upon request.
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Analysis
Table 1 reports the results of our analysis of Violent MIDsd,t, which uses a Poisson model.
43
[Table 1 About Here]
Due to the presence of multiplicative interaction terms, interpretation is not straight-
forward. The interaction terms are negative, indicating that the impacts of Parityd,t and
Future Declined,t are decreasing in Econ Aidd,t, as expected.
44
To facilitate fuller interpretation, below we present graphs of the predicted values of
Violent MIDsd,t for theoretically interesting values of the independent variables.
45 Consider
Figures 1 and 2. The graphs in these figures plot the predicted value of Violent MIDsd,t as
a function of Parityd,t and Future Declined,t when Econ Aidd,t takes on its mean value for
the Israel-Egypt dyad and when Econ Aidd,t takes on a value of 0. All other variables are
set to their mean values for Israel and Egypt following the Camp David accords.46
[Figures 1 and 2 About Here]
When Econ Aidd,t takes on a value of 0, the predicted number of MIDs involving the use
of force increases as either Parityd,t or Future Declined,t increases, as indicated by the red
lines. Yet the blue lines indicate that when Econ Aidd,t takes on its mean value for Israel
and Egypt following the Camp David accords, these effects disappear. At this level of aid,
the relationship between the predicted number of violent militarized interstate disputes and
parity on the one hand, or rapid shifts in power on the other, is essentially flat.
43A Pearson χ2 goodness-of-fit test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the data are Poisson distributed
in the specification shown in Table 1. A negative binomial model shows no overdispersion in the data.
44The coefficient estimates on Parityd,t and Future Declined,t are positive, indicating that, in the absence of
subsidies, these factors are positively associated with conflict, which is also expected. However, these effects
are not distinguishable from zero, in contrast to the expectations of Proposition 1 and 2 and Corollary 3. We
hesitate to read too much into this, however, given the small number of observations and the large number
of studies that have reported the expected patterns regarding parity and shifts in power.
45As recommended by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006).
46That is, in both graphs, Violent MIDsd,t−1 is set equal to 0 and PKOd,t is set equal to 2. In Figure
1, where Parityd,t varies, Future Declined,t is held constant at its mean of −.0006. In Figure 2, Parityd,t is
held constant at its mean of 0.46.
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Our results indicate that the number of violent militarized disputes that would have
occurred between Israel and Egypt after the Camp David accords would have been substan-
tially higher if not for the foreign aid provided by the United States. This suggests that it
was not President Carter’s mediation at Camp David, or the peace treaty resulting from that
meeting, that reduced the likelihood of conflict between Israel and Egypt, but the increase
in foreign aid that, while reaching particularly high levels in 1978 and 1979, began to rise
dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.47
According to our estimates, had the US provided one-tenth as much economic assistance
as it actually did between 1974 and 1983—which would be roughly the amount of aid given
between 1964 and 1973—Israel and Egypt would have experienced 6 violent MIDs in the
decade following the Yom Kippur War. While the absence of any violent disputes in this
period is not anticipated by our statistical results—which would expect roughly 1.5 violent
MIDs to have occurred48—our analysis nonetheless indicates that US foreign aid substantially
reduced the likelihood of conflict between Israel and Egypt at a crucial time.
Table 2 reports the results of an OLS regression analysis of Econ Aidd,t.
[Table 2 About Here]
The first thing to note is that our results suggest that, prior to the Yom Kippur war,
the US did not condition the amount of aid it gave to Israel and Egypt on expectations of
conflict. This is evident from the coefficient estimate on Expected MIDsd,t, which tells us
the effect of this variable when Post Yom Kippur t is equal to 0 due to the multiplicative
interaction. While this coefficient estimate is negative, seeming to imply that the expectation
of conflict discouraged aid, it is statistically indistinguishable from 0.
47From 1948 to 1973, the average amount of economic assistance provided by the US to Israel and Egypt
in any given year was approximately $410 million. From 1974 to 1977, the average was approximately $3.2
billion. In both 1978 and 1979, the total amount of economic aid provided was approximately $4.6 billion.
48This figure is merely the sum of the average number of violent militarized interstate disputes predicted
in each year from 1974 to 1983.
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In contrast, after the Yom Kippur War, not only did the US provide more aid even in
the absence of expectations of conflict,49 but, more importantly, the amount of aid provided
by the US increased when observable indicators (such as parity and shifts in power) pointed
towards a greater expectation of conflict. Figure 3 illustrates this.
[Figure 3 About Here]
Here, we plot the predicted level of economic assistance as a function of Expected MIDsd,t,
both before the Yom Kippur War (in red) and after (in blue). We can see here that even
when observable indicators point to a very low risk of hostility, the amount of aid our analysis
leads us to expect the US to give is greater in the years following the Yom Kippur War than
before. But in such cases, this difference is relatively modest. As the number of MIDs that
would be expected to occur absent subsidies increases, however, the two lines begin to diverge
sharply. This is because, as expected, the US has tended to respond to an elevated risk of
conflict by providing more aid since the Yom Kippur War, but did not do so prior to that.
This suggests that at least part of what has driven US provision of economic assistance to
Israel and Egypt since the Yom Kippur War has been the expectation that doing so would
prevent conflicts that would otherwise have occurred.
Further Examples
We now turn to a brief discussion of other examples of third parties providing tangible
economic benefits to former/potential belligerents in ways that we think may have reduced
the prospects for armed conflict.
In 1974, Cyprus experienced a coup that brought to power a government seeking unifica-
tion with Greece. Turkish forces invaded Cyprus shortly thereafter. By war’s end, the island
was divided into a Turkish north and Greek south. The de facto partition is not considered a
definitive resolution by any of the parties, and the conflict remains unresolved to this day.50
49As indicated by the positive and significant coefficient estimate for Post Yom Kippur t.
50For information about the conflict, see http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/.
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Though the Greek military junta that backed the coup collapsed during the conflict,
replaced by a democratic government that showed no interest in a military conflict with
Turkish forces, the possibility of conflict between the two was considerable. Greece withdrew
from NATO in response, only rejoining in 1980. Soon after the war ended, the UN began
a series of attempts to settle the conflict. These efforts have been partially successful, but
the issue remains unresolved, and the latest UN attempt at mediation, the Annan Plan, was
rejected in a referendum by Greek Cypriots in 2004 (New York Times, 4/25/2004).
Attempts to resolve the conflict have been unsuccessful, but the absence of a return to
conflict might be attributable to successful conflict management. Both Turkey and Greece
saw a dramatic jump in bilateral trade with the US in 1974. The total volume of trade
between the US and Greece averaged roughly $155 million between 1948 and 1973.51 In
1974, this figure jumped to $575 million, dropping slightly to $515 million in 1975 and then
increasing back up to $565 million in 1976. Similarly, the total volume of trade between the
US and Turkey averaged roughly $205 million between 1948 and 1973. In 1974, that jumped
to $500 million, increasing further to $580 million in 1975 and then $675 million in 1976.
These patterns can be seen clearly in Figure 4.
[Figure 4 About Here]
While we cannot say for sure that the US was seeking to provide conditional subsidies in
order to prevent renewed hostilities, the timing of the simultaneous and dramatic increases
in bilateral trade with these two states is quite striking. We are not aware of any plausible
alternative explanation for this pattern. Moreover, since these increases occurred under the
same administration that initiated the US policy of buying peace between Israel and Egypt
through the provision of conditional subsidies, it is not difficult to imagine that a similar
strategy may have been at work here.
Recent work similarly indicates that third parties can prevent civil conflict by providing
subsidies. Savun and Tirone (2011) demonstrate that democratizing states receiving higher
51The Correlates of War Trade Data Set Barbieri and Keshk (2012), Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009).
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levels of aid are less likely to experience conflict than those that receive less aid. The authors
explain this finding by claiming that democracy aid resolves commitment problems. Our
argument suggests a different interpretation: democracy aid may simply prevent conflict by
raising the opportunity cost of war. We need not believe that the underlying commitment
problems are resolved in order to explain the pattern identified by the authors.
Finally, talks between Serbia and Kosovo have recently broken down, and this is seen as a
major blow to Serbia’s EU bid.52 Though the EU has failed, at least for now, to bring about
agreement between these former disputants by linking their behavior to tangible economic
benefits, this further indicates that attempts by third parties to buy peace come in a variety
of forms from a variety of actors.
Conclusion
Recent literature on conflict management suggests a tension between the ability of third
parties to bring peace in the short run relative to the long run. While the overall logic of
this argument is persuasive, we believe there are important exceptions that have not been
adequately explored previously. While it may be true on average that conflict management
only delays the inevitable, this need not be the case.
Our bargaining model suggests that there are two conditions under which third parties
may bring lasting peace without directly resolving the information or commitment problems
that threaten to cause conflict. First, by their very nature, commitment problems due to
rapid shifts in power disappear after said shift in power takes place. If a third party can
provide sufficient subsidies, even temporarily, it may discourage inefficient fighting in the
short term without promoting conflict in the long term.
Second, sometimes third parties have sufficiently large and/or stable interests to provide
subsidies indefinitely. In so doing, they may indefinitely delay conflict. This may not be as
desirable as resolving the underlying problem, but it can nonetheless be quite effective.
52Reuters, 4/2/2013.
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Lest this latter point sound like a mere theoretical possibility of little more than academic
interest, we have argued that this is precisely what the United States has done with Israel
and Egypt. Our results challenge existing claims about the peace between Israel and Egypt,
suggesting that the best account for the reduction in conflict between these two states is
external subsidies provided by the US in the form of foreign aid. Moreover, our results
suggest that Israeli-Egyptian relations have been stabilized, but a return to conflict at some
point in the future is not unforeseeable. Provided the United States remains committed to
providing foreign aid to these two nations, the specter of war may remain forever on the
edge of the horizon. But should the US cease to provide aid, as some members of Congress
advocate, the peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt may be put at risk.
To further demonstrate the relevance of our argument, we briefly discussed other examples
of third party attempts to link peace to tangible economic benefits, focusing on Turkish and
Greek relations with the US following the Turco-Cypriot War, the impact of democracy aid
on the risk of civil conflict, and the EU’s decision to make Serbian accession conditional
on normalized relations with Kosovo. Though we did not discuss any of these examples in
great detail due to limitations of space, we believe they illustrate that our argument applies
to cases other than the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that conditional subsidies can come in the
form of foreign aid, increased trade, or admittance to international organizations.
Though such arguments lie beyond the scope of this analysis, we wish to acknowledge that
the strategy of purchasing peace through foreign aid has some unfortunate consequences.
Specifically, one might argue that, much as recipients of US foreign aid appear to have
an incentive to have a terrorism problem (Bapat 2007), Israel and/or Egypt may have an
incentive to make sure that fear of a return to past levels of violence never quite disappears.
Moreover, US foreign aid may have allowed Mubarak to remain in office, and to refrain from
undertaking democratic reform. We therefore do not wish our claim to have demonstrated
a link between US foreign aid and a reduced likelihood of conflict between Israel and Egypt
to be taken as an endorsement of this policy.
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Our primary goal has been to demonstrate that conflict management can be more effective
than recent arguments indicate. Even though it may often be implausible for third parties to
practice genuine conflict resolution, that need not mean that they are incapable of facilitating
lasting peace—provided that they are willing to pay what may be a rather considerable
price. To be sure, third parties often will not be willing to make extended commitments to
continuously subsidizing peace. But sometimes they will be. We believe that the history of
the Arab-Israeli conflict supports our theoretical arguments.
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Table 1: Analysis of Violent MIDsd,t For Contiguous Arab-Israeli Dyads, 1948–2001
Covariate Coefficient Estimate
Violent Midsd,t−1 0.54∗∗∗
(0.16)
PKOd,t 0.65
∗∗
(0.29)
Econ Aidd,t 1.20e
−03
(4.40e−03)
Parityd,t 11.29
(8.72)
Future Declined,t 66.87
(118.49)
Parityd,t × Econ Aidd,t −4.21e−03
(9.45e−03)
Future Declined,t × Econ Aidd,t −0.11
(0.19)
Constant −6.77
(4.18)
Log likelihood -119.09
LR χ2 54.42
Pseudo R2 0.19
Notes: Poisson Regression. N = 188. Cell
entries are coefficient estimates; standard
errors in parentheses.
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Analysis of Econ Aidd,t For Contiguous Arab-Israeli Dyads, 1948–2001
Covariate Coefficient Estimate
Econ Aidd,t−1 0.90∗∗∗
(0.07)
Econ Aidd,t−2 −0.40∗∗∗
(0.09)
Econ Aidd,t−3 0.13∗∗
(0.07)
Egyptd,t 277.03
∗∗∗
(85.22)
Expected MIDsd,t −18.72
(104.81)
Post Yom Kippur t 515.29
∗∗∗
(128.89)
Expected Midsd,t × Post Yom Kippur t 1561.39∗∗∗
(591.71)
Constant 93.52
(76.78)
F(7,192) 172.47
Adjusted R2 0.86
Notes: OLS Regression. N = 200.
Cell entries are coefficient estimates;
standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 1: Predicted Values of Violent MIDsd,t by Parityd,t
Note: Graph based on the poisson regression shown in Table 1. All variables
set to their means for Israel and Egypt after Camp David: Violent MIDsd,t = 0,
PKOd,t = 2, and Future Declined,t = −0.006. Red line indicates Econ Aidd,t is
equal to 0. Blue line indicates Econ Aidd,t of $2.9 billion, the mean value for
Israel and Egypt after Camp David.
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Figure 2: Predicted Values of Violent MIDsd,t by Future Declined,t
Note: Graph based on the poisson regression shown in Table 1. All variables
set to their means for Israel and Egypt after Camp David: Violent MIDsd,t = 0,
PKOd,t = 2, and Parityd,t = 0.46. Red line indicates Econ Aidd,t is equal to
0. Blue line indicates Econ Aidd,t of $2.9 billion, the mean value for Israel and
Egypt after Camp David.
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Figure 3: Predicted Values of Econ Aidd,t byExpected MIDsd,t
Note: Graph based on the OLS regression shown in Table 2. The lagged values
of the dependent variable are set to their means for Israel and Egypt after Yom
Kippur. Red line indicates predictions prior to the Yom Kippur War. Blue line
indicates the predictions following the Yom Kippur War.
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Figure 4: Bilateral Trade with the US for Turkey and Greece
Note: Measured in hundreds of millions of current US dollars. Source: the
Correlates of War Trade Data.
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Appendix
Before turning to the proofs, we first establish some important preliminary results.
Let VtA(·, ht) and VtB(·, ht) denote the continuation values, defined recursively, for A and
B given some outcome and some history of play. For example, VtA(xt, ht) would denote A’s
continuation value given history ht, and given that, in period t, B accepts A’s proposal xt.
While many aspects of ht have no impact on the player’s payoffs, the outcomes of previous
battles play an important role, as we will discuss more below.
Further, let δ ∈ (0, 1) be a common discount factor.
For example, if in all future periods, A neither attacks B nor proposes terms any B would
reject, VtA(x, ht) = xt+σtA+δVt+1A(x, ht+1) and VtB(x, ht) = 1−xt+σtB+δVt+1B(x, ht+1).53
Let VtA(w, ht) and VtB(w, ht) denote the continuation values for A and B, respectively,
following a battle in period t that is won by A. Similarly, let VtA(l, ht) and VtB(l, ht) denote
their continuation values following battles that A loses, i.e., those won by B.
For example, should A choose to attack B immediately in period t but offer proposals that
B will accept regardless of type in all subsequent periods regardless of the outcome of the
current battle, A receives ptI
(
qt−c+δ
(
Vt+1A(x, h
w
t+1)
))
+(1−ptI)
(
q
t
−c+δ(Vt+1A(x, hlt+1))),
where hwt+1 denotes the history of play as of period t+ 1 given that A won a battle in period
t and hlt+1 denotes the history in t+ 1 given that A lost a battle in t.
We assume VtA(·, hwt ) > VtA(·, hlt) ∀ t and VtB(·, hwt ) < VtB(·, hlt) ∀ t. We further assume
VtB(l, ht) − VtB(w, ht) = VtA(w, ht) − VtA(l, ht). The substantive interpretation of these
assumptions is that, at any time, for either type of B, players profit from winning battles
and suffer when losing them, regardless of whether they continue fighting or subsequently
reach a negotiated agreement. Moreover, the extent to which the victor profits is identical
to the magnitude of the defeated state’s loss. Note, these assumptions are not necessary for
any our key results. However, they greatly simplify our derivations.
53Naturally, VtB(x, ht) depends on B’s type (i.e., the value of mtB . In the interests of space, we report
generic representations.
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Next, we establish a generic acceptance rule for B. In any given period t, B accepts A’s
proposal of xt iff UB(acc) ≥ EUB(rej), or
1− xt + σtB + δ
(
VtB(x, ht)
) ≥
ptN
(
1− qt − c+ δ
(
VtB(w, ht)
))
+(1− ptN)
(
1− q
t
− c+ δ(VtB(l, ht))),
which simplifies to
xt ≤ qt + c+ σtB + δ
(
VtB(x, ht)− VtB(l, ht)
)
+ ptN
(
qt − qt + δ
(
VtB(l, ht)− VtB(w, ht)
))
.
For notational convenience, let
xt ≡ qt + c+ σtB + δ
(
VtB(x, ht)− VtB(l, ht)
)
+ p
tN
(
qt − qt + δ
(
VtB(l, ht)− VtB(w, ht)
))
,
and
xt ≡ qt + c+ σtB + δ
(
VtB(x, ht)− VtB(l, ht)
)
+ ptN
(
qt − qt + δ
(
VtB(l, ht)− VtB(w, ht)
))
,
where
p
tN
≡ mtA
mtA +mtB + αt
and ptN ≡
mtA
mtA +mtB + αt
.
Similarly, it will be useful later to define
p
tI
≡ mtA
mtA +mtB
and ptI ≡
mtA
mtA +mtB
.
Note that xt and xt are identical, save that one includes ptN and one ptN . Since ptN < ptN ,
it follows that xt < xt, provided qt − qt > δ
(
VtB(w, ht) − VtB(l, ht)
)
. This inequality must
hold, as the right hand side is strictly negative by assumption.
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To ensure interior solutions, we assume throughout that 0 < xt < xt < 1. Otherwise, A’s
optimal strategy in equilibrium may involve extreme proposals, those allocating all of the
good to either A or B.
We can now state B’s acceptance rule more succinctly. The relatively weak type accepts
iff xt ≤ xt and the strong type accepts iff xt ≤ xt, where qt − qt > VtB(w, ht) − VtB(l, ht),
and thus xt < xt, ensures that any proposal that would be accepted by the relatively strong
type will also be accepted by the relatively weak type.
Thus, while A does not know the value of mtB, since A knows that mtB = mtB with
probability ω, mtB = mtB with probability 1− ω, and xt < xt, A can infer the following:
Pr(war|xt) =

1 if xt > xt
1− ω if xt < xt ≤ xt
0 if xt ≤ xt.
Therefore, A can also deduce that EUA(xt > xt) is
ω
(
ptN
(
qt − c+ δ
(
VtA(w, ht)
))
+ (1− ptN)
(
q
t
− c+ δ(VtA(l, ht))))+
(1− ω)
(
p
tN
(
qt − c+ δ
(
VtA(w, ht)
))
+ (1− p
tN
)
(
q
t
− c+ δ(VtA(l, ht)))),
while EUA(xt < xt ≤ xt) is
ω
(
xt + σtA + δ
(
VtA(x, ht)
))
+
(1− ω)
(
p
tN
(
qt − c+ δ
(
VtA(w, ht)
))
+ (1− p
tN
)
(
q
t
− c+ δ(VtA(l, ht)))),
and uA(xt ≤ xt) is simply
xt + σtA + δ
(
VtA(x, ht)
)
.
31
To simplify the analysis, we focus on cases where war is inefficient and thus A has no
incentive to select any value of xt save xt or xt. This requires an additional restriction that
primarily concerns the continuation values, which we identify below.
Note that setting xt = xt is always strictly preferred to xt < xt, since uA(xt ≤ xt) =
xt+σtA+δ
(
VtA(x, ht)
)
and this expression must be smaller when xt < xt than when xt = xt.
Intuitively, if A is unwilling to risk war, it is still best to at least extract the best possible
deal to which the strong type of B would agree.
Similarly, setting xt = xt is strictly preferred to xt < xt < xt, since A provokes war with
the strong type of B either way and receives worse agreements from the weak type of B
when setting xt < xt < xt relative to xt = xt. Thus, if A is to risk war, A might as well seek
to extract the best possible deal from the weak type of B.
Now consider whether A prefers xt = xt to xt > xt. Since A provokes a war with the
strong B either way, this is equivalent to asking whether A prefers to have the weak B
accept xt rather than also fighting a war against a weak B, which is true if and only if war
is inefficient. This holds so long as
xt + σtA + δ
(
VtA(x, ht)
) ≥ ptN(qt − c+ δ(VtA(w, ht)))+ (1− ptN)(qt − c+ δ(VtA(l, ht))),
which simplifies to
2c+ σt + δ
((
VtA(x, ht)− VtA(l, ht)
)
+
(
VtB(x, ht)− VtB(l, ht)
)) ≥
ptN
(
δ
((
VtA(w, ht)− VtA(l, ht)
)− (VtB(l, ht)− VtB(w, ht)))). (1)
Provided Inequality 1 holds, war is inefficient, and A will only ever select xt or xt. Since,
as discussed above, we have already assumed that the benefit to the victor of a battle is
equal to the loss suffered by the loser, or VtB(l, ht)− VtB(w, ht) = VtA(w, ht)− VtA(l, ht), the
right hand side of Inequality 1 goes to 0, and the inequality must hold. Had we not made
this assumption, there would still be cases in which war is inefficient.
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What remains then is to determine how A decides between these to proposals.
A prefers xt = xt, which guarantees acceptance, to xt = xt, which risks war, provided
xt + σtA + δ
(
VtA(x, ht)
) ≥ ω(xt + σtA + δ(VtA(x, ht)))+
(1− ω)
(
p
tN
(
qt − c+ δ
(
VtA(w, ht)
))
+ (1− p
tN
)
(
q
t
− c+ δ(VtA(l, ht)))).
This simplifies to ω ≤ ωˆtx, where ωˆtx is defined as
2c+ σt + δ(V
x
tB − V ltB) + ptN
(
δ(V ltB − V wtB) + (V ltA − V wtA)
)
2c+ σt + δ(V xtB − V ltB) + (ptN − ptN)(qt − qt) + ptN
(
δ(V ltB − V wtB)
)
+ p
tN
(
δ(V ltA − V wtA)
) .
Note that, to preserve space, we use V kti to denote Vti(k, ht) ∀ i ∈ {A,B}, k ∈ {x,w, l}.
We shall continue to do so from this point forward.
Provided both the numerator and denominator are positive, we can be sure that ωˆtx is
strictly bounded between 0 and 1, since the denominator is identical to the numerator but for
two differences. First, the denominator includes (ptN−ptN)(qt−qt), which is strictly positive.
Second, whereas the numerator contains p
tN
(
δ(V ltB − V wtB) + (V ltA − V wtA)
)
, the denominator
instead contains ptN
(
δ(V ltB−V wtB)
)
+p
tN
(
δ(V ltA−V wtA)
)
, which differs only in that δ(V ltB−V wtB)
is multiplied by ptN in the denominator and by ptN in the numerator. Since B’s continuation
value after A loses battles is greater than after A wins battles, this difference also serves to
increase the denominator relative to the numerator.
We can thus succinctly characterize A’s optimal proposal in any given period, x∗t , as
x∗t =
 xt if ω ≤ ωˆtxxt if ω > ωˆtx.
Now consider A’s decision over whether to attack immediately or to negotiate. First,
suppose ω ≤ ωˆtx, indicating that A will propose xt, which B accepts regardless of type,
should A attempt negotiations at all.
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When ω ≤ ωˆtx, A prefers negotiation to attacking immediately provided
xt + σtA + δV
x
tA ≥ ω
(
ptI(qt − c+ δV wtA) + (1− ptI)(qt − c+ δV ltA)
)
+
(1− ω)(p
tI
(qt − c+ δV wtA
)
+ (1− p
tI
)
(
q
t
− c+ δV ltA)
)
.
This simplifies to ω ≤ ωˆtm, where ωˆtm is defined as
2c+ σt + δ(V
x
tA − V ltA + V xtB − V ltB)−
(
(p
tI
− p
tN
)(qt − qt)
)
(ptI − ptI)
(
(qt − qt) + δ(V wtA − V ltA)
) +
δ
(
p
tN
(V ltB − V wtB)− ptI(V wtA − V ltA)
)
(ptI − ptI)
(
(qt − qt) + δ(V wtA − V ltA)
) .
Now suppose ω > ωˆtx, indicating that, should A negotiate rather than attacking B
immediately, A will propose xt, a proposal that B accepts iff relatively weak. Then A
prefers negotiation to attacking immediately provided
(1− ω)
(
p
tN
(
qt − c+ δ
(
VtA(w, ht)
))
+ (1− p
tN
)
(
q
t
− c+ δ(VtA(l, ht))))+
ω
(
xt + σtA + δ
(
VtA(x, ht)
)) ≥ ω(ptI(qt − c+ δV wtA) + (1− ptI)(qt − c+ δV ltA))+
(1− ω)(p
tI
(qt − c+ δV wtA
)
+ (1− p
tI
)
(
q
t
− c+ δV ltA)
)
,
or ω ≥ ωˆtb. For reasons of space, we report ωˆ−1tb rather than ωˆtb, where ωˆ−1tb is
2c+ σt + δ(V
x
tA − V ltA + V xtB − V ltB) + (ptN − ptN)(qt − qt)
(p
tI
− p
tN
)
(
qt − qt) + δ(V wtA − V ltA)
) +
ptN
(
δ(V ltB − V wtB)
)− p
tN
(
δ(V wtA − V ltA)
)
+ (ptI − ptI)
(
qt − qt + δ(V wtA − V ltA)
)
(p
tI
− p
tN
)
(
qt − qt) + δ(V wtA − V ltA)
) .
With these elements in place, we are now prepared to discuss the propositions laid out
in the text, all of which concern the likelihood of war.
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Proofs of the Propositions
It follows readily from above that A attempts negotiations when ω ≤ min{ωˆtx, ωˆtm} or
ω ≥ max{ωˆtx, ωˆtb}, and attacks when ωˆtm < ω ≤ ωˆtx or ωˆtx < ω < ωˆtb.
This implies that the ex ante probability of war can be characterized as follows:
pr(war) =

1− ω if ω ≥ max{ωˆtx, ωˆtb}
1 if ωˆtm < ω ≤ ωˆtx or ωˆtx < ω < ωˆtb
0 if ω ≤ min{ωˆtx, ωˆtm}.
Proposition 1. The region in which war occurs with probability 0 lies beneath two cutpoints,
ωˆtx and ωˆtm. As either of these cutpoints decreases, the region in which peace obtains with
certainty shrinks. Similarly, as either ωˆtx or ωˆtm increases, the region in which war occurs
with probability 1− ω shrinks.
Let ∆INt denote ptI−ptN . Observe that ωˆtm has −
(
(p
tI
−p
tN
)(qt−qt)
)
in the numerator.
It also contains δ
(
p
tN
(V ltB−V wtB)−ptI(V wtA−V ltA)
)
. Having assumed that V wtA−V ltA = V ltB−V wtB,
we can rewrite this second piece as −δ((p
tI
− p
tN
)(V ltB − V wtB)
)
.
If we then evaluate
∂ωˆtm
∂∆INt
, we obtain
−(qt − qt)− δ(V ltB − V wtB)
(ptI − ptI)
(
(qt − qt) + δ(V wtA − V ltA)
) , .
Since qt > qt and V
l
tB > V
w
tB by assumption, this quantity must be negative.
Naturally,
∂∆INt
∂αt
> 0, and thus the more advantage accruing to B in a given period due
to shifting power, or the more rapid power is shifting, the lower ωˆtm will be, and there will
be fewer values of ω under which A’s optimal strategy is certain to produce peace.
It is straightforward to establish that
∂ωˆb
∂∆INt
≥ 0. Thus, as αt increases, the regions in
which war occurs with probability 0 and 1− ω are both decreasing relative to the region in
which war occurs with certainty.
This establishes the proposition.
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Proposition 2. Again, note that the region in which war occurs with probability 0 lies beneath
two cutpoints, ωˆtx and ωˆtm.
Let ∆Nt = ptN − ptN and ∆It = ptI − ptI denote the extent to which A is uncertain over
the likelihood of victory in a battle in period t given that said battle results from failed
negotiations or from A attacking immediately, respectively.
Note that ωˆtx has
(
(ptN − ptN)(qt− qt)
)
in the denominator. It also contains δ
(
ptN(V
l
tB−
V wtB)− ptN(V wtA − V ltA)
)
. We can rewrite this as δ
(
(ptN − ptN)(V ltB − V wtB)
)
.
If we then evaluate
∂ωˆtx
∂∆Nt
, we obtain
− (qt − qt) + δ(V
w
tA − V ltA)
2c+ σt + δ(V xtB − V ltB) + (ptN − ptN)(qt − qt) + ptN
(
δ(V ltB − V wtB)
)
+ p
tN
(
δ(V ltA − V wtA)
)wˆtx
which is negative since qt > qt and V
l
tB > V
w
tB by assumption.
Therefore, as ∆Nt increases, ωˆtx decreases, and war is at least weakly more likely to occur.
What remains is to establish ∆Nt is greatest when A and B are near parity. Let us then
evaluate
∂∆Nt
∂mtA
, or the effect of mtA on the difference between 1’s ability to defeat a weak B
and a strong B in the even that B rejects xt. This is equivalent to
∂
mtA(mtB −mtB)
(mtA +mtB)(mtA +mtB)
∂mtA
,
which gives us
mtA −mtB
(mtA +mtB)(mtA +mtB)
− mtA(mtB −mtB)
(mtA +mtB)
2(mtA +mtB)
− mtA(mtB −mtB)
(mtA +mtB)(mtA +mtB)
2
,
which is positive so long as mtA ≤ √mtBmtB.
Thus, ∆Nt increases in mtA until mtA reaches the geometric mean of mtB and mtB, which
we might think of as indicating parity. Further increases in mtA beyond this point decrease
∆Nt and thus make peace more likely. Therefore, parity increases the likelihood of war.
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Proposition 3. The proof of this proposition follows readily from the previous two proofs.
Observe that ωˆtm contains ∆
I
t in the denominator in precisely the same way that ωˆtx contains
∆Nt . If we evaluate the cross partial
∂2ωˆtm
∂∆INt ∂∆
I
t
, we obtain
− (qt − qt) + δ(V
w
tA − V ltA)
(ptI − ptI)
(
(qt − qt) + δ(V wtA − V ltA)
) ∂wˆtm
∂∆INt
,
which must be positive, since both terms are negative.
This tells us that the impact of rapid shifts in power, established by evaluating
∂ωˆtm
∂∆INt
,
is increasing in magnitude as we approach parity, or as ∆It increases, and, analogously, this
impact is decreasing as we move away from parity. This establishes the result.
Proposition 4. First, let us define stable interests more precisely. Let tι denote the exogenous
shock to ιt in period t. As E(tι) increases, we might say that C’s interests are less stable.
The following beliefs and strategies constitute an MPE. In any given period t,
1. C sets σt = σˆt iff ιt ≥ ιˆt, setting σt = 0 otherwise;
2. A attacks B prior to negotiations iff ωˆtm < ω ≤ ωˆtx or ωˆtx < ω < ωˆtb, sets xt = xt iff
ω ≤ ωˆtx, and xt = xt otherwise;
3. The weak type of B accepts iff xt ≤ xt;
4. The strong type of B accepts iff xt ≤ xt.
5. A and C believe B to be weak with probability ω if A sets xt = xt, with probability
1 if A sets xt = xt and B accepts, with probability 0 if A sets xt = xt and B rejects,
with probability ω′w if A attacks and wins the ensuing battle, and with probability ω
′
l
if A attacks and loses the ensuing battle,
where ω′w ≡
ptIω
ptIω + ptI(1− ω)
and ω′l ≡
(1− ptI)ω
(1− ptI)ω + (1− ptI)(1− ω)
are posterior beliefs
defined by Bayes’ Rule.
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Let σˆt be the minimum value of σt that ensures that ω ≤ min{ωˆtx, ωˆtm} holds. The
precise value depends upon which of the two cutpoints is lower, but is identified readily in
either case by solving ω ≤ ωˆtx or ω ≤ ωˆtm for σt.
Let ιˆt be the minimum value for which ιt − σˆt ≥ 0 holds. Of course, then, ιˆt = σˆt.
The beliefs follow readily from Bayes’ Rule, and incentive compatibility for each players’
strategies follows from the preceding results.
Now suppose that had C set σt = 0, we would have ω > max{ωˆtx, ωˆtb}. Then if ιt ≥ ιˆt,
but ιt+1 < ιˆt+1, C will set σt = σˆt in period t but σt+1 = 0 in the following period, and
we would conclude that C’s subsidies in period t merely shifted the risk of war due to
informational problems into the future, as per the equilibrium.
All else equal, it is more likely to be true that ιt ≥ ιˆt while ιt+1 < ιˆt+1 as E(tι) increases.
We therefore conclude that C is more likely to shift the risk of war due to information
problems into the future as C’s interests become less stable.
Proposition 5. Take the same beliefs and strategies as in the previous proposition.
Now suppose that were C to set σt = 0, we would have either ωˆtm < ω ≤ ωˆtx or
ωˆtx < ω < ωˆtb, but if C sets σt+1 = 0, we will have ω ≤ min{ωˆtx, ωˆtm}. This requires αt+1 to
be arbitrarily small relative to αt, or that the bulk of the shift in power occurs in t.
Here, even if ιt ≥ ιˆt, but ιt+1 < ιˆt+1, in which case C will set σt = σˆt in period t but
σt+1 = 0 in the following period, peace obtains in both periods in equilibrium. We therefore
conclude that even temporary subsidies ensure lasting peace, as per the proposition.
Proposition 6. Consider once more the same beliefs and strategies as above.
Suppose that were C to set σt = 0 in any given t, we would have ω > max{ωˆtx, ωˆtb} and
thus there would be a risk of war due to informational problems.
Provided either that ιt through ιt+k are sufficiently large or E(t+1ι) through E(t+kι) are
sufficiently small, for some k ∈ [1,∞), C will set σt = σˆt in periods t through t + k, and
peace is expected to obtain in equilibrium for at least k periods even though there would be
a risk of war due to information problems otherwise. This establishes the result.
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